Response and synthesis to section 2 “Competing Perspectives” in Morris III & Browne, Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest. 2001.
Malcolm Sillars “Defining Movements Rhetorically: Casting the Widest Net” (115-124)
He says that the problem with the theory of movements is that it’s “what does it tell us about that theory when it is failed to generalize in actual practice and when most movement studies are unrelated to the theory” space (115). He then defines movements in a broad sense from, what I can only assume, is based on the series that seems describing and critiquing: “some combination of events occurring over time which can be linked in such a way that the critic can make a case for treating them as a single unit” (116). He also describes movement theory as linear, which usually looks like identifying laws or rules that are revealed in one movements that can then predict how a new movement will unfold. He encourages the rhetorical critic to see alternate patterns or even no pattern in all. He summarizes that’s the main problems with current movement theory is “linearity, cause-and-effect, and intent” (118).
He recommends that, “the rhetorical critic selects form an infinite body those phenomena seen as related and defines a rhetorical movement in a manner which will gain the adherence of others with similar objectives and standards” (120). These standards are “usefulness” and “carefulness,” which he argues all rhetorical critics must adhere to.
What critics look at in terms of discourse is open-ended, but a rhetorical analysis must include:
- Messages
- Relation of messages to environment/interpretive scene
- Environment might/should include conflicting and supporting messages
For Sillars, this method produces a new definition to work from: “Movements, then, are collective actions which are perceived by a critic. They are defined by that critic in terms of the most useful rhetorical events, conflicts, or strategies which will best explain the critic’s view of the movement” (122).
I do not understand how creating unifying criteria for movements, which critics interpret from events within that guideline, will attend to the very charge that Sillars uses to frame his review: “But what does it tell us about the theory when it has failed to generalize in actual practice and when most movement studies are unrelated to the theory? It means that the time has come to examine some of the underlying assumptions about the theory” (115), which he claims are “linearity, cause-and-effect, and intent” (118). However, his own schema is rigidly confined to analytic lenses that, while different, are still seeking a “generalized actual practice” which rhetorical analysis should contribute to by focusing on usefulness and carefulness. These are, to be sure, good methodological practices, but his revised definition of movements, which gives power to the interpretation, will produce varied results, thus leading to the same incongruous breadth of work.
I don’t understand the logic of wanting a generalized principle by which we can categorize events as movements, and his own work demonstrates that such endeavors have failed to produce such an aim. Thus, like McGee, I am suspicious not of the results of the work, but the very assumption that there is a unified theory to be extrapolated and a unified approach to be used.
Michael Calvin McGee “’Social Movement’: Phenomenon or Meaning?” (125-136)
He begins with the clear assertion that he does not believe rhetoric of social movements is a distinct theoretical domain, but that it could be if we think of it less as a phenomenon and more of a theory of human consciousness (125).
For McGee, the issue is not “if” they exist, but “how” they exist. He essentially argues that the critic’s use of language and framework that they use to explain social movements is less the work of pinpointing and examining phenomena, and more “an attitudinal/stylistic alternative with the power to express an individual ordering of social reality and to dictate the nature of any generalization I might subsequently offer. Each term, in other words, is a meaning, a conclusion one comes to about the phenomenon being witnessed” (127). His point: rhetoric of social movements is not about movements, but about those who study them, which egregiously leads to “the mistake [of] treating the meaning as if it were itself a phenomenon” (127).
He is not swayed by current movement theory to see a phenomena that can be studied, but instead as an interpretive lens that generates supportive claims that the researcher set out to find. For McGee, “’Social movements’ ought not to be a premise with which we begin research, defining what we want to see and, lo and behold, finding it. Rather, ‘social movements’ out to be a conclusion, a carefully considered and well-argued inference that changes in human consciousness are of such a nature that ‘social movement’ has occurred, or that the rhetorical activity of a group of human beings would produce ‘social movement’ if it were effective” (133).
I concur that when and if we start from social movements, then we are always already looking for it, and justify social events as demonstrating its presence. To be sure this is the task of scholarly work to an extent, but it lacks the curious impulse to make meaning from what we see, rather than make what we see fit meaning. That is not to say that we must choose one over the other, or that both can’t exist. However, it is to say that the work done and that will be done is limited by its own definitions and even time period. We are always looking back instead of looking at the present and future opportunities for public rhetorical engagement to take place. [AVL1]
This from-the-movement-outward approach is problematic not only for the reasons Sillars and McGee have provided, but what David Zarefsky sees as a bifurcated and competing approach.
David Zarefsky “A Skeptical View of Movement Studies” (137-146)
Scholars have tended toward two approaches to movements: historical and theoretical. For Zarafsky, the historical is more fruitful because the theoretical approach “seeks to make generalizable claims about patterns of persuasion characteristic of movements as a class,” and “use individual movements [sic] as case studies to test general propositions which not only explain persuasion in the past but also permit predictions about the future” (137).
The question he explores through his review is: “[do] movements comprise a distinct rhetorical genre, either in the sense that they have a unique form or in the sense that they arise in in a unique type of situation” (138).
He breaks down various prominent scholars’ definitions of movements, which includes:
- Cathcart: “a rhetorical form featuring a dialectic between the established order and those who question its moral legitimacy” (138).
- Simons and others: “collective action conducted outside the framework of established institutions to achieve major social change” (140).
For Zarefsky, there is no definitive logic or evidence that social movement rhetoric, or the theory of it, has a distinct “theoretical domain” (143).
Just because the house is not in order, as it were, does not compel Zarefsky to abandon movement studies, but instead to utilize the historical framework in order to understand the events more effectively. He argues that, “[But] the reason to study the movement’s rhetoric is not that a distinct class of rhetoric thereby will be identified. Instead, the reason is that the movement either had or failed to have historical significance, and that our understanding of history will be enhanced by attention to its rhetorical dimensions.” (143)
Zarefsky extends this rationale toward a repositioning of the work by stating that, “What is true of movement studies may be true of other types as well: that we have created constructs and rhetorical categories prematurely, and on an a priori basis rather than as the outgrowth of historical research” (144).
Stephen E. Lucas, “Coming to Terms With Movement Studies” (146-
Lucas takes aim at McGee’s arguments, first stating that his movement as phenomenon is a staw man fallacy of sociologists that McGee treats reductively. His reading of McGee is that the human consciousness claim identifies a gap in analytical information, which Lucas argues movement study scholars already know and do in their work. He also sees the lack of citation for examples to represent his claims as a staw man argument. He also sees McGee’s critique as epistemologically ubiquitous. While movements may not be the appropriate referent, any descriptor would fall equally as short. Thus, for Lucas, phenomenon and meaning are false dichotomies (148).
Having said that, he examines the term “rhetorical movement” as a potential candidate, though with the understanding that 1) it “offers no evident advantages over the more sharply defined ‘social movement’” and 2) sociologists acknowledge that successful movements “depend[s] upon their ability to challenge persuasively prevailing thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, and values” (150-51). This term, like movement, however, has not offered sufficient evidence to be a suitable term.
For Lucas, the terms are less important than what the concept contributes in terms of better description, analysis, and interpretation. Whether it be movement studies or rhetorical movements, Lucas reminds us that, “the role of rhetoric in social movements cannot be explained either by looking solely at the formal properties of the movement discourse or by applying a priori premises about the importance of rhetoric in the construction of social reality, but only by careful investigation of the interplay between discourse and the other factors that condition the process of social movements” (153), which include “objective material conditions, rhetorical discourse, and the perceptions, attitudes, and values held by it’s members (152).
Lucas concludes with two questions that encapsulate the discussion in the “Competing Perspectives” section of Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest: what should we be doing, and how should we be doing it?
James R, Andrews “History and Theory in the Study of the Rhetoric of Social Movements”
From James R. Andrews we are cautioned that, “the pitfall the historian must avoid in discerning patterns of historical events is the imposition of consistency at the expense of complexity” (163). It is also Andrews who clearly cautions that, “The rhetorical historian’s independence of theory must come through his or her willingness to examine the process of rhetorical influence without preconceived theoretical notions of how that process must have worked in particular cases” (159). Finally, it is his statement about the sequence of methods demonstrates his position within the larger debate: “The historian, by asking the question, how did rhetoric function in a particular social movement, may uncover complexities of or deviations from current theory, and may consequently generate data enriching our development of theory. Essentially, atheoretical historical studies provide less tainted information with which theories can subsequently deal” (159).
[AVL1]Zarefsky would have a problem with this…address that
Queer/strokes/ 