Research question and lit review outline

Outline for lit review:

• Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest is a seminal work in the field of rhetorical movement studies. Divided into foundational texts, divergent approaches to theoretical and definitional concepts, and case studies, the anthology offers rhetorical students and scholars a glimpse of the key disciplinary work that has framed analysis of social movements as well as offers gaps for further examination into shifts in both movement studies and social activism. Morris & Browne’s “Introduction” articulates the necessity of understanding the evolution of social movement definitions, especially given its continued growth and critical examination.
• However, Morris & Browne’s greatest contribution in the introduction is to ground social movement study in the rhetorical realm, as loci of rhetorical engagement within counter/publics, whose goal is deep and rich engagement with discourses of power. Thus, while subsequent chapters may contest, broaden, narrow, or even redefine social movements for particular ends, it is Morris and Browne’s definition that I wish to begin with:

…they [social movements] organize symbols to persuasive ends; they address unsettled issues of public importance; and they seek change not through violence or coercion but through force of argument and appeal. Now, symbols, persuasion, contingency, public life, argument, and appeal are all concepts definitive of rhetoric itself; thus when we discover the rhetorical dynamics of a particular movement, we are really finding something out about rhetoric in general. (2)

• The emphasis in this is on the rhetorical dynamics that collective action bring to public discussions of various forms. While the available means of rhetorical engagement is expansive (visuals, texts, bodily arguments, speeches), Morris and Browne demonstrate that protest is merely an avenue for examining the nature of rhetorical engagement. Thus, social movements are merely the means by which we discover or amend the complex and multifaceted processes and aims of rhetoric.

Understandably, using social movements as means of rhetorical investigation requires a sense of what movements are, where they are found, and how they engage rhetorically. The rest of the anthology attempts to do just that in a concise but comprehensive manner, exploring the implications of using “social movements” as a realm of rhetorical scholarship as well as the effects of scholar’s inquiry and analysis.

• Zarefsky, for instance, situates social movement analysis within his career-long emphasis on historical, rhetorical scholarship. For Zarefsky, the aim of social movement scholarship should, first and foremost, contribute to the historical relevance of rhetorical action:

“[But] the reason to study the movement’s rhetoric is not that a distinct class of rhetoric thereby will be identified. Instead, the reason is that the movement either had or failed to have historical significance, and that our understanding of history will be enhanced by attention to its rhetorical dimensions.” (143)

• The interplay between history and the rhetoric of movements is tantamount to understanding the social movements’ goal. For Zarefsky, the scholars’ understanding of social movements should always be couched within an understanding of the historical impact or effect. In other words, we might better understand history by examining a social movement as a result of historical forces that shaped the social and political conditions at the time. Or we might better understand the rhetorical constraints that made one movement successful–and thus recognizable within the historical moment in which it gained attention–and another not. More importantly, Zarefsky highlights that the rhetorical dynamics that are articulated through social movement studies is not in itself a unique class of rhetoric, but instead a mere demonstration of rhetorical engagement through avenues of protest, dissent, and social unrest.
• In a similar vein to Zarefsky, Andrews explains that,

The historian, by asking the question, how did rhetoric function in a particular social movement, may uncover complexities of or deviations from current theory, and may consequently generate data enriching our development of theory. Essentially, atheoretical historical studies provide less tainted information with which theories can subsequently deal” (159).

• For Andrews, like Zarefsky, it is the social movements’, and thus the study of movements’, orientation to history and rhetorical engagement, not theory, which drives productive examinations of social movements because it centers our analytic lens on the relevance of a social movement to a particular, contextual, historical moment. Not only does such a position tie to the historical tradition of rhetorical scholarship more largely, but also joins in rhetorical scholarship more largely in terms of understanding the contextual nature of rhetorical dynamics, rooted always in the historical moment, material conditions, class consciousness, gender and sexuality markers, and social/political landscapes.
• But what is the function of rhetoric in social movements? According to Lucas,

“the role of rhetoric in social movements cannot be explained either by looking solely at the formal properties of the movement discourse or by applying a priori premises about the importance of rhetoric in the construction of social reality, but only by careful investigation of the interplay between discourse and the other factors that condition the process of social movements” (153), which include “objective material conditions, rhetorical discourse, and the perceptions, attitudes, and values held by it’s members (152).

• Reservations about the a priori assumptions about the ubiquity of rhetoric in movements’ discourse will lead scholars to blindly adopt potentially inaccurate and even  misguided claims about movement discourse. Like the issue of context that I hear in Andrews, the interplay between rhetoric and the material and social conditions that influence discourse is echoed in Lucas. Grounding social movement study in the key requisites for rhetorical analysis is necessary for the following reasons:
  • it tempers claims about the nature of social assemblages and social discourse which data and analysis cannot demonstrate and support
  • it roots social movement claims in rhetorical scholarship as opposed to sociology or feminism solely (to name a few). That is not to say that these other disciplines do not have much to contribute to rhetorical scholarship; however, it is to say that examples and approaches to social movements must be analyzed and described in rhetorical terms if movements are to be the purview of rhetorical scholarship
  • it continues the tradition of rhetorical scholarship while complicating the unilateral portraits of persuasion that remain from Aristotle
• Perhaps the most productive articulation of these problems comes not from Zarefsky, Andrews, or Lucas [check this in terms of gaps], but from McGee, whose contribution to the anthology is an abstract admonishment toward scholars’ misguided assumptions. McGee in one particular section sums up his concerns in the following way:

“’Social movements’ ought not to be a premise with which we begin research, defining what we want to see and, lo and behold, finding it. Rather, ‘social movements’ ought to be a conclusion, a carefully considered and well-argued inference that changes in human consciousness are of such a nature that ‘social movement’ has occurred, or that the rhetorical activity of a group of human beings would produce ‘social movement’ if it were effective” (133).

• McGee both questions the very nature of social movements as social action and not paradigmatic shifts noticeable through effect and the analytic evidence that scholars use to substantiate claims about the nature of social movements. While other authors criticize his claim that social movements are indicative of shifts in human consciousness, or some of his generalized claims about disciplinary influences [find better way to phrase this] that scholars have toward social movements, it is McGee’s insight into the taken-for-granted assumption that social movements exist a priori to analysis that is of particular interest to me.
• Another way to explain the dimensions of the critique that McGee offers is to read him along side Sillers, who claims that,

Movements, then, are collective actions which are perceived by a critic. They are defined by that critic in terms of the most useful rhetorical events, conflicts, or strategies which will best explain the critic’s view of the movement” (122).

• If social movements tell more about rhetoric than social discourse writ large, then Sillers argues that social movement scholarship is more indicative of the critic’s assumptions and value system about social movements.
• Here, for example, is a sample of social movement definitions that make such assumptions, relying heavily on identity movements from the 60s, 70s and 80s:
  • Simons and others: “collective action conducted outside the framework of established institutions to achieve major social change” (140).
    • key to this definition is understanding social change as a reshifting of social ideology presented by those excluded from established institutions. Read: those who are outside the power structures that write ideology into policy and social norms
  • Griffin: an uninstitutionalized collectivity that mobilizes for action to implement a program for the reconstitution of social norms or values (35).
    • Here, the collectivity is again conceived of as outside institutions of power and whose purpose is to reframe the norms or values that are influenced by institutional ideology
  • Smith & Wides: “collective actions directed toward radical change in the social order” (88).
    • In this definition, it is clearer that the process in which values and norms are shifted is through radical change. Radical change in terms of social movements is understood as protest, petitions, or other demonstrations which seek large social paradigmatic shifts in the status quo
  • Cathcart: “a rhetorical form featuring a dialectic between the established order and those who question its moral legitimacy” (138).
    • Here, the paradigmatic shift is understood as an engagement with the moral rationale that underpins the dominant ideology which shapes social values and norms
• Later definitions become more complex as they include more specific details about who and how social movements affect changes in social landscapes
  • Harlow: Collective action, which Tilly defined as ‘joint action in pursuit of common ends’ (1978: 84), such as a protest or petition campaign, can be employed as part of a social movement, or it can be a one-time event. (228)
    • Here, common ends is somewhat ambiguous, however, the means by which change is effected is more clearly defined, and the scale of change is broadened
  • Van Laer & Van Aelst: Social movements, following Diani (1992), can be defined as ‘networks of informal interaction between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict on the basis of a shared collective identity’ (Diani 1992, p. 13). Their ‘repertoire of collective action’ is, as Tilly (1984) originally pointed out, the ‘set of means that are effectively available to a given set of people’ and which they use to act collectively in order to make claims on individuals and groups (see also McAdam et al. 2001; Taylor & Van Dyke 2004). [1147]
    • The spectrum of what counts as a social movement and collective is more carefully described as individuals, groups, or organizations, which offers a wider spectrum of who engages in social change. Additionally, it is more clearly articulated that the process is confrontational in nature (though that does not mean extreme or violent), ultimately attempting to shift ideologies about identity and groups.
    • How social movements make these changes is through rhetoric, as “a set of means that are effectively available to a given set of people” is of course reflective of Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric as “persuasion through available means” [cite this]
• Miller’s survey of social movement literature reveals the following components of definitions spanning decades:

Scholars define social movements as collective efforts or behaviors (Staggenborg 2011, McAdam and Snow 1997), organized by polity outsiders (Gamson 1975, 1990, McAdam and Snow 1997), utilizing sustained campaigns (McAdam and Snow 1997), and non-institutionalized methods (McAdam and Snow 1997), continuing over a period of time (Staggenborg 2011, McAdam and Snow 1997), seeking to bring about some type of social change (Staggenborg 2011, McAdam and Snow 1997, Johnston and Klandermans 1995, McCarthy and Zald 1977, Gamson 1975), challenging structural arrangements or systems (Staggenborg 2011, McCarthy and Zald 1977), and interacting with government officials and authorities, the public and media, bystanders, supporters and opponents (Staggenborg 2011).

• Miller’s own work with gay and lesbian social movements, however, begins to narrow the definition, which I argue reflects underlying assumptions about social movement theory since its beginning examination of identity politics in the 60s and 70s

• Miller: Taylor and Whittier (1992) suggested that a significant variable in all social movements is collective identity; the social movements of the 1970s and 1980s had distinctive cultural appearances with identities based on sexuality, race, class, gender and other ‘social cleavages.’

• Exploring further the who of social movements, Miller cites three key components of collective identity:

Taylor and Whittier (1995) have developed three ways of defining collective identity: 1) the challenging group is differentiated from the dominant group through boundaries, 2) a challenging group’s frames are to define its interests, and 3) to use symbols and everyday actions to challenge existing systems of domination. (Miller 34)

• Miller: Meyer and Whittier (1997), Cohen (1985), Melucci (1985), Touraine (1985) suggested that new social movements organize around a common identity and also look to question changes in the state as well as prevalent cultural understandings of their group and dominant meaning systems. (Miller 33)
• Thus, through the particular case studies that Miller takes on, we get a more particular definition:

Kane (2000) asserted that the lesbian and gay social movement is influenced by cultural factors because of conflicting cultural views on human sexuality and indicated countermovement activity and public opinion as two signs of cultural opposition that could influence the movement’s success. (Miller 35)

My reasons for focusing on this particular case study is multi-dimensional:

1. Miller brings to light some of the key components of what social movements are, namely that they are countermovements whose exigency is the contestation of cultural ideology of sexuality specifically. More importantly, we are getting a clearer sense of the who of social movements, not merely as collectives, but as groups of disenfranchised people intent on changing dominant discourse about the group’s marginal position in society and its subsequent muting and even erasure of access to institutions and cultural forces that shape values and ideology, which often frame the dissenting group in negative terms
2. The “available means” is better understood as those processes, through whatever channels necessary, that a collective uses to disrupt dominant ideology and norms
3. A clearer, more transparent description of the role of identity in social movements is articulated:

Meyer and Whittier (1997), Cohen (1985), Melucci (1985), Touraine (1985) suggested that new social movements organize around a common identity and also look to question changes in the state as well as prevalent cultural understandings of their group and dominant meaning systems. Taylor and Whittier (1995) argue that new social movements work to change cultural coding by targeting institutions in civil society, as well as the state. (Miller 33)

What we gain from this narrowed definition and more modern examples of social movements is the sense that the people who form social movements are groups of people who share a common identity, and the work of social movements is to challenge institutional and state codes (values, norms, processes) through discursive disruptions. This narrow definition is also attributed to new social movements, whose divergence from mere social movements is X

The definition also aligns more (and is closely echoed) by descriptions of counterpublics:

• Citing Asen and Brouwer, Loehwing and Motter define counterpublics as:

“…spheres [that] voice oppositional needs and values not by appealing to the universality of the bourgeois public sphere but by affirming specificity of race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, or some other axis of difference” (2001, 7). The normative commitments of counterpublic studies focus on inclusion in order to promote a kind of equality that illuminates “questions of fairness and justice” in an actually existing democracy (Asen 1999, 117), because, explains Fraser, “some new form of public sphere is required to salvage that arena’s critical function, and to institutionalize democracy” (1990, 58). [228]

• Loehwing & Motter then later use Asen to highlight that,

“As a critical term,” writes Asen, “counterpublic signifies the collectives that emerge in the recognition of various exclusions from wider publics of potential participants, discourse topics, and speaking styles and the resolve that builds to overcome these exclusions” (2000, 438). Thus, this critical term assists scholars in identifying marginalized groups and accounting for the unique ways in which they engage wider publics or the state, with the hope that a communicative ethic that can treat all publics more democratically will result. (228)

• Loehwing & Motter also quote Asen as stating that,

“According to counterpublic studies, overcoming exclusion remains the practical goal of a counterpublic ‘to publicize alternative interpretations of identities, interests, and needs’” (Asen 2000, 429). [233]

From these definitions several key components of social movement and counter-dominant groups become very clear:

1. Movements and groups are understood to be constituted by and through identity. Identity is what, according to this range of definitions, motivates individuals to join together to oppose codes through rhetoric. Needs, interests, and values are presumed to be aligned through identity. Or rather, it is the shared identity of people within movements and counterpublics that scholars assume–or as McGee would say, seek to find before adequate evidence–joins them in resisting norms, values, and codes which other them.
2. Most definitions of social movements include language like “collectives,” but this gives way to “social movements.” Collectives are treated as the beginning stages of identification with others. However, the language quickly shifts within definitions from collectives to movements, making way to the following possible implications:
   1. Collectives are less powerful and potentially less effective than movements
   2. Movements take place in the more mature stages of collective organizing [there’s a source I need to reference that talks about stages of mobilization, so check this against that, though I remember it reflecting this sentiment].
   3. Movements are more fully-formed, likely through a sense of clearer or concise articulation of the problems or demands of the organized collective.
   4. In solidifying a purpose and identity, collectives become, over time, successful or ineffectual movements.
   5. Institutions and the state may only recognize social movements as opposed to collectives, perhaps even more so because of the list above
   6. Collectives do not take place over time, or in sustained measure. Movements, on the other hand, can and do
3. Most scholars presume that social movements work across periods of time, or have sustained efforts to enact change. Indeed, the measure of the effect of social movement is often tied to how much change we can see happen over time pertaining to the needs and demands of the movement.

It is these three presumptions that I wish to engage with and complicate. Like McGee, I am suspicious of the ubiquitous use of “social movements” as a categorization for various iterations of “the people’s” engagement with dominant discourses (see also McGee “In Search of the People”). Further, like  those scholars whose focus remains in the rhetorical, I am skeptical of rhetorical engagement being so intimately tied to identity and large-scale movements. In pursuing case studies that already fit the requirements of a movement, we are potentially missing productive, fruitful disruptive moments whose effect is short-lived and yet still powerful.

What would collective, rhetorical action look like if we resist normative or dominant conception of social movement scholarship? Resisting the normative conceptions of what a social movement is and who participates in rhetorical action places from a queer rhetorical perspective? What components would frame a queer reading of collective action?

Using three case studies, I will explore the following questions:

• How can we approach collectives without presuming and/or prescribing notions of identity to the people who work toward the same goals? Would this disrupt the progression of collectives toward movements in key definitions of social movements?
• How can we foreground rhetorical action in examining collective work without slipping into large claims about identity?
• What are influences in moments of conflict that assist us in reframing who, what and why people attempt disruption against institutions, states, and global discourses of domination? (digital circulation and new media)